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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SCM LAND COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V S . • • ] 
WATKINS & FABER, and ] 
WALTER P. FABER, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19172 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case involves the legal effect of an oral 
promise for additional office space given by a lessor in 
July, 1979 to induce a long-time tenant (Appellant) to sign 
a three year written renewal lease for Appellantfs regular 
office space in the Newhouse Building. The regular office 
space had been continuously leased by Appellant for many 
years prior thereto. After the written renewal lease for 
the regular office space was signed by Appellant, the 
lessor sold the building and assigned the written lease to 
Respondent. Respondent then immediately leased under a 
long-term written lease the promised additional space to IML 
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thereby making it impossible to honor the original 
lessor's promise to Appellant. After learning of SCMfs 
purchase of the building and the lease to IML, Appellant 
notified SCM of the promise, SCM refused to fulfill 
the promise and therefore Appellant terminated the written 
renewal lease and moved from the building as of April 1, 
1981. Respondent SCM then commenced this action against 
Appellant for rent for the remainder of the term of the 
written renewal lease. 
DISPOSITION- IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court required the jury to find 
specific elements of an oral contract or it could 
not return a verdict for Appellant. Because of the 
instructions, the jury could not find those specific 
elements of an oral contract and returned a verdict for 
Respondent. The lower court entered its judgment against 
Appellant requiring Appellant to pay the rent for the 
remainder of the lease term together with interest and 
attorney fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests this Court to reverse the 
lower court and hold that the lessorfs oral promise was 
the consideration for the execution of the written renewal 
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office lease and that Appellant was entitled to rescind 
the lease for failure of the promise. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts pertinent to the issues of this case 
are undisputed. For convenience they have been divided 
into numbered paragraphs. 
1. In June, 19 79, Appellant Watkins & Faber had 
been a tenant of the Newhouse Building with office space 
on the sixth floor for twelve years under a succession 
of written leases. (R-290; see Exhibit 2-P). 
2. In June, 1979, the owner of the Newhouse 
Building was Mr. Richard W. Fischer. (R-263, 290). Mr. 
Kenneth P. Swinton was Mr. Fischer's resident building 
manager and agent for negotiating leases. (R-263, 264, 
290) . 
3. The Watkins & Faber lease then in effect was 
due to terminate on June 30, 1979 (R-265, 290), and Mr. 
Swinton contacted Mr. Walter P. Faber, Jr. several times 
during the latter part of June, 1979 in regard to signing 
a renewal lease. (.R-265, 291). 
4. Mr. Faber told Mr. Swinton that Watkins & 
Faber needed additional adjacent space on the sixth floor 
and would not sign a renewal lease unless the additional 
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space was promised. (R-266, 268, 296, also see R-232-33). 
5. At that time, IML was a month-to-month tenant 
of the adjacent space on the sixth floor and was planning 
to move from the adjacent space to the eleventh floor in 
the building. (R-267, 270, 292). 
6. Mr. Swinton told Mr. Faber that he didn't 
think there would be any problem in getting the adjacent 
space but that Mr. Fischer, the owner of the building, was 
out of town and would have to make the promise when he 
returned. (R-268, 294, also see R-232). 
7. Mr. Swinton then talked to Mr. Fischer 
about Watkins & Faber!s request, and Mr. Fischer !s 
reaction was favorable. (R-269-70). 
8. A week or so prior to the end of June, 
1979, Mr. Swinton delivered the proposed renewal lease 
for Watkins & Faberfs regular office space to Watkins & 
Faber!s office. (R-293, 265-66). 
9. The lease remained in the office of Watkins 
& Faber and was not signed by Watkins & Faber until July 
9, 1979 when Mr. Fischer returned and discussed with Mr. 
Faber Watkins & Faber1s position that the firm would not 
renew the lease unless the additional space was promised. 
(R-297-98). Mr. Fischer and Mr. Swinton came to Mr. Faber!s 
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office on that date and after discussing the situation 
Mr* Fischer said he was informed that IML was planning 
to move within two or three months and would be moved 
from the sixth floor by the end of December, 1979. 
(R-295-98). Mr. Fischer then stated that if Watkins 
& Faber would sign the renewal lease for the regular 
office space, the adjacent space would be made available 
to Watkins & Faber not later than December 31, 19 79. 
(R-298). 
10. Also at the time of the promise, Mr. 
Fischer, Mr. Swinton and Mr. Faber went into the adjacent 
space occupied by IML, discussed Watkins & Faberfs need 
for several additional offices, the locations of the 
dividing partitions for the additional space, and agreed 
that the additional space would be rented at the "going 
rate". (R-272-73, 296, also see R-233-36). Mr. Faber 
then signed the written renewal lease. (R-29 8). Both 
Mr. Swinton and Mr. Faber testified to the above facts. 
Mr. Fischer was not present at trial and did not testify. 
11. The written renewal lease does not contain 
an integration provision. (Exhibit 2-P) . 
12. In October, 1979, Mr. Faber was seriously 
injured and was hospitalized until sometime in January, 
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1980. (R-300) < He was thereafter confined to a wheel-
chair and did not return to work full time in 1980. 
(R-301). 
13. In 1980, Watkins & Faber periodically 
checked the progress of IMLfs remodelling of the eleventh 
floor. (R-284-86, 300, 302). 
14. IML continued its work on the remodelling 
of the eleventh floor but had not completed the same and 
therefore had not moved by September, 198 0 when Mr. 
Fischer sold the building to SCM. (R-303). 
15. When SCM purchased the building, SCM gave 
IML a written long-term lease for the adjacent space on 
the sixth floor, and SCM took over the eleventh floor 
that IML had been remodelling. (R-305-06). The purchase 
by SCM and long-term lease to IML were done without 4 
notice to or the knowledge of Watkins & Faber. (R-19 2-9 3, 
303-04). 
16. In September, 1980 when Watkins & Faber { 
learned of the sale of the building to SCM and of the 
long-term lease for the adjacent space on the sixth floor 
between SCM and IML, Watkins & Faber contacted SCM and i 
informed SCM of Mr. Fischer's promise. (R-303-06). 
17. Thereafter, in several discussions SCM said 
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that Watkins & Faber could not have the adjacent space on 
the sixth floor but that SCM would lease to Watkins & Faber 
the needed additional office space on another floor. SCM 
also said that if Watkins & Faber still wanted to have all 
of its offices on one floor then SCM would lease the entire 
fourth floor to Watkins & Faber, and then Watkins & Faber 
would be responsible for the excess space which SCM 
suggested Watkins &. Faber might be able to sublease to 
others. (R-307-08). 
18. Watkins & Faber notified SCM that such 
proposals were not acceptable because Watkins & Faber's 
prior experience with the separation of offices had been 
unsatisfactory and because of Mr. Faberfs physical 
condition. (R-307). Watkins & Faber moved from the 
building on April 1, 1981. (R-308-10)• 
19. In the fall of 1981, SCM commenced an action 
against Watkins & Faber for unpaid rent from and after 
April 1, 1981 when Watkins & Faber moved from the building. 
20. The trial court refused to allow the jury to 
consider whether the oral promise was consideration for the 
execution of the written lease of July 9, 1979. The lower 
court stated to counsel at R-329-30: 
. . . And as I pointed out in chambers, the 
record ought to reflect that throughout the 
litigation and through a good portion of this 
trial the defendants have referred to their defense 
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as a failure of consideration. This court does 
not view this matter as a failure of consideration 
case, but, rather, an oral contract, the perform-
ance of which was a condition precedent. 
21. The trial court instructed the jury that it had 
to find certain definite elements of a specific oral contract 
for the additional space or it could not return a verdict for 
Watkins & Faber. Instructions 16 (R-140) and 17 (R-141) 
state as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16. 
You must return a verdict for the plaintiff unless 
the defendants establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence the truth of all of the following propositions: 
1. Richard Fischer and Watkins & Faber entered 
into an oral contract to enter into a written lease for 
additional space on the sixth floor of the Newhouse Building 
2. If there was such an oral contract, the oral 
contract was intended by the parties to the contract to 
be a condition precedent to the written lease agreement 
for Suite 606 becoming effective. 
3. If there was such an oral contract, it was 
breached. 
4. If there was such an oral contract and it was 
breached, the defendants acted within a reasonable time 
after it was breached to rescind the written lease. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17. 
For there to be an oral contract, the parties 
must express their mutual assent and understanding to 
the terms of the contract. This means that the parties 
must have arrived at a sufficiently definite understanding 
as to the terms so that they knew what they were 
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bound to do. These terms include the 
additional space to be leased, the price 
for the additional space, the term for the 
additional space, and the remodeling costs 
for the additional space. 
22. The parties stipulated and the court ruled 
that exceptions could be taken after the jury retired to 
deliberate. (R-326) . 
23. Appellant objected to the lower court's 
refusal to use Appellant's requested Special Interrogatories 
5, 6 and 9 generally for the reason that Appellant only 
needed to prove that there was a promise to provide the 
additional space and not that there was an enforceable 
contract. (R-331). Appellant's exceptions to Instructions 
16 and 17 go to the issues whether the promise was consid-
eration and whether the lower court in substance improperly 
directed the verdict.. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO CONSIDER THE LESSOR'S ORAL PROMISE FOR 
ADDITIONAL SPACE AS CONSIDERATION PAID TO 
INDUCE APPELLANT TO SIGN THE WRITTEN 
RENEWAL LEASE FOR APPELLANT'S REGULAR 
OFFICE SPACE. 
The written renewal lease would not have been 
entered into but for the lessor's oral promise. Without 
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notice to or the knowledge of Appellant, Respondent made 
it impossible to keep the promise by entering into a long-
term lease of the adjacent space to IML. 
The lower court concluded that the lessor's oral 
promise was not consideration for the written lease and 
that the promise itself was of no independent legal benefit 
to Appellant unless it was determined to be an enforceable 
oral contract containing certain specific elements; if those 
elements were established, then the resulting oral contract 
was a condition precedent. In Jury Instruction 18 (R-142), 
the lower court stated: 
For an oral contract, if any, to be 
a condition precedent to a written lease 
agreement, the oral contract must have 
been intended by the parties to be fully 
performed before the written lease agree-
ment was to become effective and binding. 
In this case, however, the performance of the written lease 
was begun solely because of the promise and was begun months 
prior to any anticipated performance of the promise. Thus, 
the promise itself had independent legal significance and 
was the condition under which Appellant signed the lease. 
Even though several legal doctrines might be 
applicable in some degree to the oral promise in this case, 
it seems clear that the promise itself was a condition and 
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would qualify as consideration under Utah law and provable 
by parol evidence. Several recent Utah cases appear to 
be applicable. In FMA Financial Corporation W Hansen 
Dairy, Inc., et al,, 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980), FMA sued 
Hansen for an alleged breach of a written lease of a silo 
and farm equipment. Hansen asserted the defense that the 
silo was not installed by harvest time as orally agreed. 
In FMA the lower court determined there was a complete 
failure of consideration because of failure to keep the 
oral agreement. As a result, the lessee, Hansen, did not 
have to continue the written lease. FMA appealed on the 
ground that the written lease agreement was integrated and 
did not provide when the construction of the silo was to 
be completed. FMA urged that the parol evidence rule 
prevented Hansen from proving that the silo was to be 
installed by harvest time. FMA also argued that Hansen 
knew that the silo had not been timely installed but 
thereafter acknowledged in writing that the silo was complete. 
In response to FMA's assertion of the parol evidence rule 
and FMAfs objection to the oral agreement, this court 
stated as follows: 
The standard parol evidence rule is 
that extraneous evidence may not be used to 
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contradict or vary the terms of a written 
instrument. That rule serves a useful 
purpose in appropriate circumstances in 
safeguarding the integrity of such docu-
ments. However, it should not be applied 
with any such unreasoning rigidity as to 
defeat what may be shown to be the actual 
purpose and intent of the parties, but 
should be applied in the light of reason 
to serve the ends of justice. It does not 
preclude proof of agreements as to collateral 
matters relating to the contract or its 
performance, so long as they are not incon-
sistent with nor in repudiation of the terms 
of the written agreement. Nor does it prevent 
proof that a party did not perform an 
obligation which it was understood and agreed 
by the parties was a condition precedent 
to the contract becoming effective. That 
* applies to the circumstances here, where the 
court found that the parties had an under-
standing and agreement that in order for the 
silo to be useful to the defendants it was 
to be installed by harvest time, and that 
this was an essential to the contract 
becoming effective. 617 P.2d 329. 
This court also found no basis to upset the lower court's 
holding that: 
. . . there had been a failure to furnish 
the agreed consideration by the plaintiff 
[FMA] and that therefore, the defendants 
[Hansen] were not bound to continue making 
payments on the contract. 617 P.2d 3 30. 
In Nielsen, et al. v. MFT Leasing, et al., 6 56 
P.2d 454 (Utah 1982), Nielsen sued MFT to rescind a written 
equipment lease for failure of consideration. MFT counter-
claimed for rental amounts. The lower court granted a 
rescission on the ground that there was a complete failure 
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of consideration because MFT did not provide the exact 
equipment described in the lease* MFT had apparently 
purchased the equipment from Pursinger and leased the 
equipment to Nielsen. The equipment was delivered by 
Pursinger and Nielsen acknowledged delivery. MFT argued 
that Nielsen should not have been allowed to adduce parol 
evidence of failure of consideration because it con-
tradicted the terms of the written lease. This court 
stated that: 
Evidence of failure of consideration 
does not vary or alter the terms of a con-
tract; it attacks the very existence of the 
contract for the purpose of proving it 
unenforceable. 656 P.2d 456. 
Consideration may be found in many forms and 
under a wide variety of circumstances. In Sugarhouse Finance 
Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980), this court 
stated: 
No completely satisfactory and com-
prehensive definition of "consideration" 
has ever been devised. It is generally 
agreed, however, that where a promise is 
supported by the incurrence, on the part 
of the promisee, of a legal detriment in 
order to confer a benefit on the promisor, 
such is sufficient to serve as consideration, 
thereby rendering the promise legally 
enforceable. 610 P.2d 1369, 1372. 
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Certainly, anything of value may be deemed consideration• 
For something to be consideration, it need not have the 
elements of an oral contract. 
In another case, General Insurance Company of 
America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, 545 P.2d 502, 
504 (Utah 1976), this court stated: 
There is a distinction between lack 
of consideration and failure of consideration. 
Where consideration is lacking, there can be 
no contract. Where consideration fails, there 
was a contract when the agreement was made, 
but because of some supervening cause, the 
promised performance fails. 545 P.2d 502, 504. 
Under the facts of this case, the promise itself 
must be considered as having legal significance and identity 
apart from its later performance, if any. It is submitted 
that the Lessor1s oral promise given in July, 19 79 was the 
condition and consideration for the signing of the written 
renewal lease. Without the promise, there would have 
been no written lease. It would be clearly unfair to com-
pel performance of the lease and yet deny the promise which 
brought the lease into being. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT UNLESS IT FOUND AN ENFORCEABLE 
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ORAL CONTRACT, IT COULD NOT RETURN A 
VERDICT FOR APPELLANT. 
The lower court erroneously refused to even allow 
the concept of consideration and did not even use the word 
"promise" or the word "consideration" in its instructions. 
In Instruction 16 (R-140), the lower court 
stated that the jury could not return a verdict for 
Appellant unless the jury found the following four 
propositions to be true: (1) that there was an oral 
contract for the additional space; (2) that the oral 
contract was a condition precedent to the written lease; 
(3). that the oral contract was breached; and (4) that 
Appellant acted to rescind the lease within a reasonable 
time. 
Instruction 17 (R-141) provides that there could 
not be an oral contract unless four specific elements 
were established; i.e., the additional space to be leased, 
the price, the term, and the remodeling costs. 
The lower court then stated in Instruction 13 
(R-142), that the oral contract, if any, could not be a 
condition precedent unless it was intended "to be fully 
performed before the written lease agreement was to become 
effective and binding." 
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It is submitted that under the above instructions 
the jury could not return a verdict for Appellant regard-
less that the written renewal lease would never have 
existed if the promise had not been made. The lessor's 
agent confirmed that the promise was made to induce the 
signing of the written lease. Instead, the lower court 
required a specific oral contract as a condition precedent. 
The lower court's instructions thus nullified the promise 
and essentially directed the jury to return a verdict for 
SCM. Such a result is contrary to the legal principles 
set forth in the FMA and Nielsen cases cited above, 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT 
ALLOWING APPELLANT THE ALTERNATIVE 
REMEDY TO TERMINATE THE WRITTEN LEASE 
FOR FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION EVEN IF 
THE COURT DETERMINED THAT APPELLANT 
COULD NOT SPECIFICALLY ENFORCE THE 
ORAL PROMISE. 
Through its Instructions 16 and 17 (R-140, 141) 
and Special Interrogatories (R-153-54) the lower court 
determined that unless there was an enforceable oral con-
tract, Appellant could not prevail. After the jury determined 
there was no oral contract, Special Interrogatories B, C 
and D were irrelevant. The lower court rejected the argument 
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that the promise itself was consideration and therefore 
refused to allow Appellant the alternative remedy of 
rescinding the lease upon repudiation of the promise. 
Even assuming that the promise might not have 
been specifically enforceable by Appellant for any reason 
such as the Statute of Frauds or absence of specific 
contract provisions, rescission is available if the 
promise was consideration for Appellant's signing of 
the lease. This court has discussed the definition and 
impact of failure or lack of consideration in the FMA, 
Nielsen, Sugarhouse Finance, and the General Insurance 
cases cited above, and is in accord with the decisions in 
other jurisdictions. In 17 C.J.S. Contracts §129, pages 
849-50, there is a general discussion of lack or failure 
of consideration as follows: 
It is laid down in a number of cases that 
when the consideration for a promise wholly fails 
the promise is without consideration and 
unenforceable; but this must mean that in a 
contract with an executory consideration, the 
execution of the consideration is a condition 
precedent to the liability on the promise, and 
the failure to execute the consideration dis-
charges the promisor. Where there is a total 
failure of consideration and defendant has 
derived no benefit from the contract, or none 
beyond the amount of money which he has already 
advanced, such failure of consideration may be 
shown in bar of the action. . . , 
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Section 399 of the Restatement of the Law of 
Contracts sets forth the principle that a total failure 
to receive the agreed exchange for the performance of 
a promisor*s contractual duty discharges that duty. 
In the instant case, the promise for the 
additional space was clearly the consideration for the signing \ 
of the lease. Where the consideration was repudiated, 
the appropriate remedy was rescission. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
THE JURY TO CONSIDER ON THE ISSUE OF 
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES LOST RENT ON 
ANOTHER FLOOR WHEN THERE WAS NO LEASE 
IN FORCE AND CHARGE THE SAME TO 
APPELLANT. 
The Norwest lease for the third floor was to 
terminate on April 30, 1982 (Exhibit 3-P). Even assuming 
that SCM acted reasonably in allowing Norwest to vacate 
the area on the third floor and move to the area on the 
sixth floor, SCM' would not be entitled to charge Appellant 
rent on the third floor for the months of May and June, 
1982 because Norwest was not obligated to pay rent for 
those months. In Exhibit 7-P, SCM claims credit for Norwest 
rent for the months of May and June, 19 82. Appellant 
objected to the admission of Exhibit 7-P in regard to the 
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Norwest rent. (R-215). Under no circumstances is SCM 
entitled to credit for the $1,434.00 rent plus interest 
therein awarded for those months. 
POINT V. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
STATUTORY INTEREST AT A RATE OF TEN 
PERCENT (10%) ON A LEASE MADE PRIOR TO 
MAY 14, 1981. 
Section 15-1-1, U.C.A. 1953 (1981 Supp.) provides 
as follows: 
15-1-1. LEGAL RATE. The legal rate 
of interest for the loan or forbearance of 
any money, goods, or things in action shall 
be 10% per annum. But nothing herein con-
tained shall be so construed as to in any 
way affect any penalty or interest charge 
which by law applies to delinquent or 
other taxes or to any contract or oblig-
ations made before the 14th day of May, 
1981. 
Any obligation by Appellant to pay rent originates 
in the 19 79 lease. The above amended statute prohibits 
charging of interest above the prior statutory rate of six 
percent on contracts or obligations made before May 14, 1981. 
The lower court allowed interest of ten percent on rent due 
after May 14, 1981 as verified by letter of March 21, 1983 
from SCM's counsel which letter is included in the record 
by stipulation between counsel. The letter was apparently 
inadvertently not included in the record compiled by the 
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District Court Clerk but is now located immediately following 
page 177 of the Record, 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that Appellant would not have 
entered into the written lease without the promise of 
additional space. The promise was clearly the bargained 
for consideration given by the original lessor which induced 
Appellant to incur the obligation of renewing the written 
lease. It would be fundamentally unfair and contrary to 
law to allow SCM to compel performance and receive benefits 
under the written lease and ignore the failure of the 
promise which brought the lease into being. In this 
situation, the appropriate, fair and legal remedy is rescission 
of the lease. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of June, 19 83. 
WATKINS & FABER 
By V k u ^ w ^iM49P ~ 
Brian W. Burnet t 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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